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Introduction
Many instances of cooperation in nature feature a
marked discrepancy between partners in the scope for
exploitation (Bshary & Bronstein, 2004). For instance,
when a client fish visits the territory of a cleaner wrasse
(Labroides dimidiatus), it stands to gain by removal of
ectoparasites and dead or infected tissue (reviews: Losey
et al. 1999, Coˆte´, 2000). At the same time, it runs the risk
of exploitation by a ‘cheating’ cleaner that bites live
tissue in addition to parasites (Grutter & Bshary, 2003).
Although predatory clients may be able to retaliate (or
even pre-empt) such exploitation by consuming the
cleaner (Trivers 1971, Bshary, 2001), the great majority
of client species are nonpredatory, feeding on algae and
plankton, and cannot exploit cleaners as prey (Bshary,
2001). What then prevents a cleaner from biting such a
client?
Even in cases where the opportunity for direct exploi-
tation is one sided, a potential victim may be able to
escape from its exploiter and so terminate their interac-
tion. This ‘exit threat’ potentially provides a simple form
of partner control, as early termination in response to
exploitation may entail a loss of potential mutualistic
benefits (and of the opportunity for further exploitation)
on the part of the exploiter (Schuessler, 1989; Hauk,
2001; West et al., 2002; Frank, 2003; Sachs et al., 2004;
Cant & Johnstone 2006; Foster & Wenseleers, 2006). In
the case of the cleaner wrasse, for example, if a client that
is bitten leaves in response, this ends the opportunity for
further profitable cooperation (or exploitation). Accord-
ing to the classificatory scheme of Sachs et al. (2004) and
Foster & Wenseleers (2006), such termination behaviour
constitutes a simple form of partner choice, and favours
cooperation through directed reciprocation.
Johnstone & Bshary (2002) developed a simple, game-
theoretical model to demonstrate the plausibility of
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Abstract
Intraspecific cooperation and interspecific mutualism often feature a marked
asymmetry in the scope for exploitation. Cooperation may nevertheless persist
despite one-sided opportunities for cheating, provided that the partner
vulnerable to exploitation has sufficient control over the duration of
interaction. The effectiveness of the threat of terminating an encounter,
however, depends upon the ease with which both the potential victim and the
potential exploiter can find replacement partners. Here, we extend a simple,
game-theoretical model of this form of partner control to incorporate variation
in the relative abundance of potential victims and exploiters, which leads to
variation in the time required for individuals of each type to find a new
partner. We show that such market effects have a dramatic influence on the
stable level of exploitation (and consequent duration of interaction). As the
relative abundance of victims decreases, they become less tolerant to
exploitation, terminating encounters earlier (for a given level of exploitation),
whereas exploiters behave in a more cooperative manner. As a result, the
stable duration of interaction actually increases, despite the decreasing
tolerance of the victims. Below a critical level of relative victim abundance,
the model suggests that the cost of finding a replacement partner becomes so
great that it does not pay to exploit at all.
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one-sided partner control by means of an exit threat, and
this possibility was recently experimentally verified in
the case of the cleaner–client mutualism – Bshary &
Grutter (2005) showed that cleaners may be induced to
feed on less preferred food items in response to the threat
of removal of the food. This form of control, however,
depends on the assumption that a victim who escapes
cannot immediately be replaced, as the exit threat is only
effective if early termination of an encounter imposes
some cost on the exploiter. As the power of the ‘exit
threat’ as a means of partner control thus depends on
the relative abundance of exploiters and victims (for
instance, of cleaners and clients), the interaction
between two individuals forms part of a biological market
(Noe¨ et al., 1991; Noe¨ & Hammerstein, 1994; Noe¨, 2001).
Noe¨ & Hammerstein (1994) contrasted the central
theme of market models, supply and demand, with the
central theme of most models of cooperation, ‘partner
verification’ or (in other words) the control of cheating.
While arguing that cooperative systems in which cheat-
ing plays an insignificant role are more common than
systems in which partner verification is a major problem,
they suggested that it might be important to treat
cheating and market mechanisms simultaneously in
future models. Ferrie`re et al. (2002) took an important
step in this direction, demonstrating that when cheats
suffer in competition with more cooperative individuals
for commodities provided by mutualistic partners, selec-
tion can maintain cooperation (and see Ferriere et al.
2007). However, in their analysis, the competitive
disadvantage that cheats suffer is exogenously imposed;
they do not explicitly consider the processes of partner
verification that give rise to this effect. Here, we provide a
model of mutualistic interaction in which we focus
explicitly on the control of cheating by means of the
threat of departure, and explore the impact of market
supply and demand on this form of partner control.
We extend the simple model of Johnstone & Bshary
(2002) to explore the interplay betweenmarket forces and
control over the duration of encounters, and how these
factors influence the behaviour of both exploiters and
victims and the net pay-offs that both classes of individ-
uals can expect to obtain from their interaction. Bshary &
Noe¨ (2003) predicted that partner choice on the part of
potential victims would act very generally to stabilize
mutualistic relationships (and see Sachs et al., 2004; Foster
& Wenseleers, 2006), and although our analysis is loosely
modelled on the cleaner–clientmutualism, it is potentially
applicable to many forms of intraspecific cooperation and
interspecificmutualism inwhich partners exhibit a similar
asymmetry in their strategic options. Classical examples in
which exit threats have been proposed to stabilize coop-
erative behaviour include cooperative breeding based on
‘pay-to-stay’ (Reeve, 1992; Mulder & Langmore, 1993;
Balshine-Earn et al., 1998; Bergmuller & Taborsky, 2005;
Bergmuller et al., 2005; Stiver et al., 2005), some plant–
seed predator mutualisms (Addicott et al., 1990; Dufay &
Anstett, 2003) and plant–rhizobia interactions (Herre
et al., 1999; Kiers et al., 2003).
A model of partner control in an
asymmetric encounter
Consider two populations, one of potential exploiters
(cleaners) and one of potential victims (clients). Mem-
bers of each population engage in sequential, pairwise
interactions with randomly chosen members of the
other, over a period of time that is long compared with
the duration of any one encounter. Thus, cleaners
alternate between ‘time in’ during which they are
interacting with a client, and ‘time out’ during which
they are searching for a new, available client. Similarly,
clients alternate between ‘time in’ during which they are
interacting with a cleaner, and ‘time out’ during which
they are searching for a new, available cleaner.
The pay-offs to a cleaner ⁄ client pair from a single
interaction depend upon the level of exploitation (biting
of live tissue) by the cleaner, x, and on the duration of
the interaction, t. We treat each encounter as a sequen-
tial game, in which the cleaner chooses at what level to
exploit, and the potential victim chooses the duration of
interaction in response. In the absence of exploitation
(i.e. when x = 0), both players derive a benefit b(t) from
the encounter (the client because of removal of its
parasites, the cleaner because of the food they provide);
the longer the interaction, the greater the benefit, (i.e.
b is an increasing function of t), but the returns to be
gained are finite and diminish with time. We shall
assume, following Johnstone & Bshary (2002), that
bðtÞ ¼ 1 et=k. Here, k is a parameter that determines
the shape of the benefit function. A low value of k
indicates that the mutualistic benefits of interaction
diminish rapidly (in the case of a cleaner ⁄ client interac-
tion, perhaps because the client’s parasite load is low),
whereas a high value of k indicates that the benefits
diminish more slowly. Formally, the time taken to
acquire any given fraction of the total possible benefit
is inversely proportional to k.
Exploitation imposes an additive cost on the victim,
and confers an additive benefit on the perpetrator, both
proportional to xt, the product of the exploitation level
and the duration of interaction. Quantifying exploitation
in terms of the damage inflicted on the victim, we shall
assume that the cost is equal to xt, and the benefit to cxt,
where the parameter c determines the reward gained per
unit cost inflicted (we might think of this as the
‘temptation to cheat’; a high value of c indicates that
the rewards of exploitation are large relative to the costs
imposed on the victim).
While searching, a cleaner or a client encounters
available potential partners at a rate proportional to their
availability, the constant of proportionality being denoted
ae for cleaners (exploiters) and av for clients (victims). As
encounters are random, the duration of a period of time
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out follows a negative exponential probability distribu-
tion, so that its mean (average search time) is simply the
inverse of encounter frequency. Our measure of fitness in
this population setting is the long-term average rate of
gain that an individual obtains (assuming that the pay-off
from any one interaction is as specified above).
Calculating search times and rates of gain
Consider a population in which cleaners exploit at level
x^, and clients allow their interactions to continue for time
t^. We first calculate the average time out (search time) for
cleaners and clients in this population, denoted se(^t) and
sv(x^) respectively. To do so, we note that an individual
cleaner encounters available clients at a rate proportional
to their density, but that this density depends on the
average length of time out vs. time in for clients, as this
determines the proportion that is searching for cleaners
at any given moment. Equally, an individual client
encounters available cleaners at a rate proportional to
their density, but this density depends on the average
length of time out vs. time in for cleaners, as this
determines the proportion that is searching for clients at
any given moment. se(^t) and sv(x^) are thus jointly defined
by the simultaneous equations.
seð^tÞ ¼ 1
ae
t^ þ sv
sv
; svð^tÞ ¼ 1
av
t^ þ se
se
ð1Þ
(implying that search time equals the inverse of encoun-
ter rate, which is given by the appropriate constant of
proportionality multiplied by the fraction of time that
potential partners spend searching rather than interact-
ing). These equations yield the solution
seð^tÞ ¼
1þ av t^  ae t^ þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ 2ðae þ avÞ^t þ ðae  avÞ2 t^2
q
2ae
;
sv ð^tÞ ¼
1þ ae t^  av t^ þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ 2ðae þ avÞ^t þ ðae  avÞ2 t^2
q
2av
ð2Þ
Having derived the mean time out for cleaners and
clients, we can easily determine the fitness of individuals
of both types in our population, measured as their long-
term average rate of gain, which we denote w^eðx^; t^Þ and
w^vðx^; t^Þ
w^eðx^; t^Þ ¼ 1 expðt^=kÞ þ cx^t^
t^ þ seð^tÞ
;
w^vðx^; t^Þ ¼ 1 expðt^=kÞ  x^t^
t^ þ svð^tÞ
ð3Þ
Solving for the ESS
Our population strategy pair (x^; t^) represents an ESS if an
individual cleaner or client that adopts a different level
of exploitation or allows an interaction to continue for
a different length of time cannot enjoy as great an
average rate of gain as a typical individual.
The optimal time for which a client in this population
should allow an interaction to continue, given that the
cleaner with whom it is interacting exploits at any given
level x, which we denote toptðx; x^; t^Þ, can easily be
determined through the application of the marginal
value theorem. The client should allow the interaction
to continue until the marginal value of continued
interaction is precisely equal to the marginal opportunity
cost, or, in other words, to its long-term average rate of
gain in this population, w^vðx^; t^Þ. Formally,
1
k
exp  toptðx; x^; t^Þ
k
 
 x ¼ w^vðx^; t^Þ ¼ 1 expð^t=kÞ  x^t^
t^ þ svð^tÞ
ð4Þ
where the left-hand term in the above equation repre-
sents the marginal value of continued interaction at time
toptðx; x^; t^Þ, and the right-hand term the long-term aver-
age rate of gain. This yields
toptðx; x^; t^Þ ¼ k log½svð^tÞ þ t^  k log½kð1 expðt^=kÞ
þ svð^tÞx þ t^ðx  x^ÞÞ ð5Þ
Given our assumption that the potential victim can
determine the length of interaction, our first requirement
for an ESS is therefore
t^ ¼ toptðx^; x^; t^Þ ð6Þ
implying that the population duration of interaction is
optimal (given the population level of exploitation). We
can also see from eqn 5 that topt decreases with x, so that
greater levels of exploitation by a cleaner favour earlier
termination of interaction by a client, but that (assuming
the client gains something from the interaction) topt
increases with sv(^t), implying that the client should be
willing to tolerate a longer interaction for anygiven level of
exploitation if it takes longer to find a replacement partner.
Having determined the optimal response on the part of
clients to a cleaner that exploits at different intensities,
we can also determine the long-term average rate of gain
of a cleaner in this population that exploits at level x
(assuming that clients respond optimally to any change
in the level of exploitation by a cleaner), denoted
weðx; x^; t^Þ. This is given by
weðx; x^; t^Þ ¼ 1 exp½toptðx; x^; t^Þ=k þ cxtoptðx; x^; t^Þ
toptðx; x^; t^Þ þ seð^tÞ
ð7Þ
Our second requirement for an ESS is therefore
weðx^; x^; t^Þ > weðx; x^; t^Þ for all x 6¼ x^ ð8Þ
implying that
@weðx; x^; t^Þ
@x
¼ 0 for x ¼ x^ ð9Þ
Joint solution of eqns 6 and 9 then yields an ESS
strategy pair. Unfortunately, we are unable to obtain an
analytical solution to these equations; numerical results
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for representative parameter values are, however, pre-
sented in the next section.
Incomplete control of the duration of interaction
We can extend the model to allow for incomplete control
by the victim over the length of the encounter (as a
cleaner, for instance, may be able to pursue a client or
otherwise hinder escape). To do so, we assume that the
interaction will not terminate at the victim’s optimal
endpoint. Rather, it will continue until the net marginal
costs of prolonged interaction to the victim exceed some
critical threshold relative to the net marginal benefits of
prolonged interaction to the exploiter. Only at this point,
we assume, will the former be willing to make sufficient
efforts to escape the latter. The threshold ratio of costs to
benefits depends upon the relative control that each
player can exercise over the duration of encounter; we
will assume that it is equal to s ⁄ (1 ) s), where the
parameter s (which ranges from 0 to 1) represents the
relative ‘power’ of the exploiter. s = 0 implies that
the potential exploiter has no influence over departure,
so that the interaction finishes at the optimal time for the
potential victim; greater values of s imply that the
exploiter has greater ability to prolong the interaction
(and for a sufficiently large value of smay be able to do so
indefinitely); s = 1 indicates that the potential exploiter
has full control.
Given the above assumptions, the duration of interac-
tion for a given level of exploitation, x, and exploiter
‘power’ s, denoted ~tðx; x^; t^; sÞ, satisfies
 1
k
exp ~tðx; x^; t^; sÞ
k
 
 x
 
þ 1 expðt^=kÞ  x^t^
t^ þ svð^tÞ
 
¼ s
1 s
1
k
exp ~tðx; x^; t^; sÞ
k
 
þ cx
 
 1 expð  t^=kÞ þ cx^^t
t^ þ seð^tÞ
 
ð10Þ
where the left-hand side of the above equation repre-
sents the net marginal cost of continued interaction for
the client (i.e. the difference between the marginal
benefit of continued interaction and the marginal oppor-
tunity cost, which is equal to the long-term average rate
of gain in the population), and the right-hand side
[s ⁄ (1 ) s)] times the net marginal pay-off to continued
interaction for the cleaner. This yields
which reduces, in the special case of s = 0 (implying
complete control by the victim), to the expression for
toptðx; x^; t^Þ given in eqn 5.
We can then re-derive the long-term average rate of
gain of a cleaner that exploits at level x, allowing for
incomplete control over the duration of interaction,
which we denote ~weðx; x^; t^; sÞ. This is given by
~weðx; x^; t^; sÞ ¼ 1 exp½
~tðx; x^; t^; sÞ=k þ cx~tðx; x^; t^; sÞ
~tðx; x^; t^; sÞ þ seð^tÞ
ð12Þ
Our ESS conditions in the extended model are then
t^ ¼ ~tðx^; x^; t^; sÞ ð13Þ
and
~weðx^; x^; t^; sÞ > ~weðx; x^; t^; sÞ for all x 6¼ x^ ð14Þ
implying that
@ ~weðx; x^; t^; sÞ
@x
¼ 0 for x ¼ x^ ð15Þ
Once again, we are unable to obtain an analytical
solution to these equations; but numerical results for
representative parameter values are again presented in
the Results section.
Results
We focus on the impact of: (1) the benefits to be gained
by exploitation; and (2) the relative abundance of
exploiters vs. victims, on the solution of the model.
Figures 1 and 2 show the stable level of exploitation,
and the corresponding duration of interaction, as a
function of c, the ‘temptation to cheat’ and log2(ae ⁄ av),
the log of the ratio of encounter rates for cleaners
compared with clients, assuming that k = 1 and
av + ae = 1. As encounter rates are proportional to the
availability of potential partners, the latter assumption
implies that the total combined abundance of cleaners
and clients remains constant, while we vary the ratio of
clients to cleaners – positive values of the ratio
log2(ae ⁄ av) imply that clients are more abundant than
cleaners, and that cleaners therefore encounter poten-
tial partners more frequently, whereas negative values
imply that clients are less abundant than cleaners, and
that cleaners therefore encounter potential partners less
frequently.
The graphs reveal that as the temptation to cheat
grows, exploitation by cleaners increases, and the dura-
tion of interaction correspondingly decreases (because of
clients terminating their encounters earlier). The out-
come of the model is also, however, strongly influenced
by the relative abundance of potential exploiters and
potential victims. When clients are abundant and
~tðx; x^; t^; sÞ ¼ k ln 1
k
ð1 2sÞ½^t þ svð^tÞ
f1þ x½^t þ svð^tÞ  s½2þ ð1 cÞ½xsvð^tÞ þ ðx  x^Þ^t  x^t^g  ð1 2sÞet^=k
 
ð11Þ
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cleaners rare, cleaners can afford to behave in an
exploitative manner, even though this induces clients
to terminate their interactions relatively early. As the
relative abundance of clients decreases, however, the
stable level of exploitation declines and clients allow their
interactions to continue longer. When clients are less
abundant than cleaners [and log2(ae ⁄ av) < 0], we see
that there is even a critical level of temptation (i.e. a
critical value of c) below which cleaners do best to
completely forego the opportunity for exploitation (i.e.
the stable level of exploitation is zero). Under these
circumstances, clients terminate their interactions earlier
than is in the best interest of cleaners, and the benefits of
exploitation to a cleaner are outweighed by the costs of
shortening its encounters still further.
When the stable level of exploitation drops to zero, and
it is the clients that terminate interaction, the duration of
encounters declines as the relative abundance of clients
decreases, as it is easier for clients to find a new cleaner
when the latter are relatively more abundant. This gives
rise to the ‘peak’ in encounter duration visible in Fig. 2 at
intermediate relative abundance (when the temptation
to cheat is low) – above the peak, encounters are
terminated by exploitative cleaners, and interaction
duration increases as clients become relatively less
abundant; below the peak, there is no exploitation and
encounters are terminated by clients; so, interaction
duration decreases as clients become relatively less
abundant (and cleaners relatively more abundant).
The key factor driving the effects described above is the
changing costs of partner replacement for clients vs.
cleaners, which are illustrated in Fig. 3. The graphs show
the time required by both types to find a replacement
partner (sv and se) at equilibrium, again as a function of c,
the ‘temptation to cheat’ and log2(ae ⁄ av), the log of the
ratio of encounter rates for cleaners compared with
clients. They confirm that as the relative abundance
of cleaners decreases, the time they require to find a
replacement partner shrinks, whereas the time clients
require to find a replacement partner increases. This
explains why cleaners can afford to exploit their victims
more intensely under these circumstances, despite the
fact that this causes their victims to terminate the
interaction earlier.
Figure 4, which shows the optimal termination time
from the client’s perspective (in a population that adopts
the stable strategy pair) as a function of the level of
exploitation by an individual cleaner, for several different
values of log2(ae ⁄ av), also confirms that as the relative
abundance of cleaners decreases, clients should be
prepared to tolerate a given level of exploitation longer
because of the increased time required to find a replace-
ment partner. As Fig. 2 shows, however, stable inter-
action time nevertheless decreases despite this greater
tolerance, because of the increase in the stable level of
exploitation.
When clients lack complete control over the duration
of encounters, cleaners may exploit at higher rates (as,
for a given level of exploitation, they are able to maintain
their interactions for a longer time). This is illustrated in
Fig. 5, which shows the stable level of exploitation as a
function of s (the extent of cleaner influence on the
duration of interaction), for different ratios of client-
to-cleaner abundance and for different levels of tempta-
tion to cheat. In all cases, exploitation increases with
cleaner control, rising rapidly and indefinitely as s
approaches some critical value; above this threshold,
clients are simply unable to escape, so that there is
nothing (given the simple assumptions of our model) to
Fig. 1 The stable level of exploitation (x), in the basic model in
which clients control the duration of interaction, as a function of the
log of the ratio of client-to-cleaner abundance [log2(ae ⁄ av)], and the
‘temptation to cheat’ (c), assuming that k = 1 and ae + av = 1. The
region in which exploitation is not favoured (i.e. x = 0) is shaded.
Fig. 2 The stable duration of interaction (t), in the basic model in
which clients control the duration of interaction, as a function of the
log of the ratio of client-to-cleaner abundance [log2(ae ⁄ av)], and the
‘temptation to cheat’ (c), assuming that k = 1 and ae + av = 1.
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prevent unlimited exploitation (see Johnstone & Bshary,
2002). The threshold is attained more readily when
cleaners are rare and have a stronger temptation to cheat.
However, these factors have a more pronounced effect at
lower values of s, as the threat of termination is stronger
under these circumstances.
Even if cleaners cannot entirely prevent clients from
escaping, if they have sufficient influence over the
duration of interaction, they will be able to exploit at a
high enough rate for long enough that clients actually
incur a net cost as a result of their interaction; in other
words, the relationship between cleaners and clients has
shifted from mutualism to exploitation and parasitism.
Figure 6 shows that this switch occurs when cleaner
control (measured by the parameter s) exceeds some
critical level (less than that required for unlimited
exploitation), which depends upon the ‘temptation to
cheat’ and the relative abundance of clients vs. cleaners.
The greater the potential benefits of exploitation, and the
greater the relative abundance of clients, the more
readily the relationship slides into parasitism (i.e. client
pay-offs drop below zero at a lower value of s under these
circumstances).
Discussion
In a previous analysis of exit threats as a means of partner
control in asymmetric interactions (Johnstone & Bshary,
2002), we focused on a single interaction between a
potential exploiter and a potential victim, and assumed
that the latter would (when capable of doing so)
terminate the encounter at the point where the dimin-
ishing marginal benefits of continued interaction
dropped below the marginal cost of continued
Fig. 3 The mean time required to find a replacement partner for
cleaners (upper graph) and for clients (lower graph) at equilibrium,
in the basic model in which clients control the duration of
interaction, as a function of the log of the ratio of client-to-cleaner
abundance [log2(ae ⁄ av)], and the ‘temptation to cheat’ (c), assuming
that k = 1 and ae + av = 1.
Fig. 4 The optimal duration of interaction (from the client’s
perspective), as a function of a cleaner’s level of exploitation, in a
population adopting the stable strategy pair. Successively higher
curves correspond to higher ratios of client-to-cleaner abundance
[log2(ae ⁄ av) = )2, 0 and 2]. In all cases, k = 1, ae + av = 1 and c = 1.
Fig. 5 The stable level of exploitation (x), as a function of s, the
extent of cleaner influence on the duration of interaction, for three
different values of the log of the ratio of client-to-cleaner abundance
[log2(ae ⁄ av)] and three different values of the ‘temptation to cheat’
(c), assuming that ae + av = 1. Solid curves give results for c = 0.5,
long-dashed curves for c = 1 and short-dashed curves for c = 2. In
each set, successively lower curves correspond to successively lower
values of [log2(ae ⁄ av)], respectively, 2, 0 and )2.
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exploitation. Here, we have set such encounters in a
market context, assuming that victims (when capable)
terminate an encounter at the point where the net
marginal benefits of continued interaction drop below
the victim’s long-termaverage rate of gain. In otherwords,
we take into account the opportunity cost of continuing to
interact with one partner. When fresh interactions offer
the possibility of a greater rate of gain, it may thus pay a
potential victim to leave, even though the net marginal
benefit of continued interaction is still positive relative to
the outside option of not interacting at all. Onemight view
this as an application of optimal foraging theory, in which
we treat each potential exploiter as a patch yielding
diminishing returns, and determine the optimal patch
residence time for potential victims that will maximize
their long-term average rate of gain.
Market effects
It is a familiar result from foraging theory that the
optimal duration of patch residence increases with
interpatch travel time (Stephens & Krebs, 1986). Simi-
larly, as we have shown here, the optimal duration of
encounter from the potential victim’s point of view
increases, for a given level of exploitation, as the relative
abundance of potential exploiters declines, because the
interencounter interval then grows longer. In the context
of cleaner–client interactions, for instance, the model
predicts that clients will tolerate greater levels of exploi-
tation for longer durations before terminating an
encounter, when they are abundant relative to cleaners,
because the mean time required to find a replacement
cleaner is then greater.
The above trend means that potential exploiters can
afford to inflict greater costs on victims when the former
are relatively less abundant, as doing so will not lead to
such early termination by the victims under these
circumstances. In addition, potential exploiters them-
selves will be influenced by the availability of replace-
ment partners. As relative exploiter abundance declines,
not only do partners become more tolerant as long as
they receive net benefits, but also the costs of victim
departure for an exploiter also decrease, as the time
required to find a new victim diminishes. This reinforces
the selection for higher levels of exploitation under these
conditions. Indeed, when relative exploiter abundance is
sufficiently low, the optimal duration of interaction may
actually be lower for an exploiter than for a victim,
despite the fact that the former enjoys not only the
mutualistic benefits of interaction (as does the latter), but
also the benefits of exploitation. Under these circum-
stances, exploitation can be favoured not only as a source
of immediate benefit, but also as a means to influence
interaction length. Inspecting Fig. 1, for instance, we see
that ‘exploitation’ can be favoured even when the
temptation to cheat c = 0, implying that exploiters gain
no immediate benefit by inflicting costs on their victims.
This occurs whenever exploiters are less abundant than
victims, because the optimal duration of encounter for
the former is then shorter than for the latter, so that
imposition of costs on a victim serves to induce it to
terminate an interaction sooner.
Comparison with previous models
A striking aspect of our results, in contrast to previous
market models like the veto game (Kahan & Rapoport
1984), is that they feature a smooth, gradual change in
the intensity of exploitation as the ratio of exploiters to
victims alters. The first biological market model by Noe¨ &
Hammerstein (1994) predicts a full switch between two
potential strategies at some critical ratio of the relative
abundance of two trading classes, above which the more
common class will be forced to offer greater benefits to
potential partners. In part, this merely reflects the
simplifying assumption in previous models that individ-
uals face the binary choice to offer high or low quality
services. However, more significantly, it is also because of
the treatment of partner choice as a binary decision. The
decision to accept or reject a potential partner is, of
necessity, an all-or-nothing one. By contrast, we have
focused on the time at which a potential victim should
terminate an encounter it has already initiated. This very
simple form of control does not require any ability to
Fig. 6 Range of values of [log2(ae ⁄ av)], log ratio of client-to-cleaner
abundance, and s, extent of cleaner influence on the duration of
interaction, over which clients obtain positive vs. negative pay-offs.
Towards the lower left, pay-offs are positive; towards the upper right,
pay-offs are negative. Successively higher curves correspond to the
boundary between positive and negative pay-offs for successively
smaller values of c, the ‘temptation to cheat’, respectively, 2, 1 and
0.5. In all cases, k = 1 and ae + av = 1.
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assess the value of a partner in advance, as the decision is
based on benefits and costs actually experienced; more
significantly, it also permits continuous variation in
response, selecting for a continuous shift in the intensity
of exploitation.
Potential for testing in the cleaner–client system
Although there are always more clients than cleaners in
coral reefs, most clients do not seek cleaning at any
moment in time (Grutter, 1997). What need to be
evaluated in future empirical tests of the model are thus
changes in the operational cleaner-to-client ratio, anal-
ogous to the operational sex ratio (Emlen & Oring, 1977)
in mating markets. Currently, we only know that clients
often terminate interactions in response to cleaner fish
cheating (Bshary & Grutter, 2002; Bshary & Scha¨ffer,
2002). The cleaning system involving the well-studied
cleaner species L. dimidiatus is further complicated by the
fact that clients may actively punish cleaners, may switch
to a different cleaner for their next inspection, and may
even avoid cleaners that they observed cheating another
client (Bshary & Grutter, 2005, 2006). Therefore, a more
suitable study species to test predictions of our model
would be the closely related cleaner wrasse Labroides
bicolor, which lacks refined cleaning stations, but roves
over large areas (Randall, 1958).
Applicability to other systems
Our model is not relevant only to the cleaner–client
mutualism, but also to any interaction in which cooper-
ation is maintained by the threat of sanctions (Herre
et al., 1999) of some form. Whereas our model assumes
that clients visit cleaners sequentially, the same issues
arise when a potential victim interacts with multiple
potential exploiters at the same time. Such a situation
exists in the mutualism between yucca plants and
the seed-predating pollinator, the yucca moth (Addicott
et al., 1990; Pellmyr & Huth, 1994; for the senita cactus-
moth system, see Fleming & Holland, 1998). The moth
female actively pollinates the flowers and oviposits into
the developing fruits. The hatching larvae eat the seeds. If
there are too many larvae in a fruit, the plant aborts it;
this corresponds to the termination of interaction in our
model, as it leads to a loss of potential mutualistic
benefits by the larvae, as well as a loss of the opportunity
for further exploitation. In the absence of partner choice,
many eggs could be laid in a fruit by the pollinator.
Where a plant has many fruits, however, our model
suggests that it might lower the threshold number of
larvae likely to trigger abortion, as proposed verbally by
Noe¨ et al. (1991), because resources can be more easily
re-allocated to other developing fruits. In other words, if
there are many pollinators on the market, it may pay
them to lower their level of exploitation (the number of
eggs laid) to increase the duration of the interaction
(necessary for successful hatching of the next pollinator
generation).
Another potential example suggested by Noe¨ et al.
(1991) to which the logic of our model applies is the
contribution of unrelated helpers in cooperatively breed-
ing species. One reason why unrelated individuals might
help to raise the offspring of breeders is to avoid eviction
from the territory (Gaston, 1978). This ‘pay-to-stay’
hypothesis was modelled by Hamilton & Taborsky
(2005). They found that if considered in isolation,
‘helpers’ impose net costs on breeders. However, the
ratio of helpers to breeders on the market determines
how easily a helper is replaced and therefore how much
it has to invest to be allowed to remain in a breeder’s
territory. In a re-analysis of data on pied kingfisher
published by Reyer (1986), Noe¨ et al. (1991) found that
the contribution of a helper relative to the breeders
increased with the number of helpers present. In line
with the interpretation of these results by Noe¨ et al.
(1991), our model suggests that a paucity of territories
may push helpers’ investment to levels that yield net
benefits to breeders because it allows for easier ‘replace-
ment’ of a lazy helper.
Possible extensions
The present model makes a number of assumptions that
might be modified or relaxed in future analyses. In
particular, we have assumed that the returns on coop-
eration diminish with time in the same manner [specified
by the benefit function, b(t)] for both parties, and that
these are independent of an individual’s past history of
interaction. In reality, however, it may sometimes be the
case that one party in an encounter can continue to
enjoy benefits from interaction beyond the point at
which (in the absence of exploitation) there is anything
to be gained for the other. In the case of cleaner fish–
client interactions, the assumption that the benefits of
cooperation diminish at the same rate for both parties is
reasonable to the extent that this decrease is the result of
the reduction in the parasite load of the client. As the
parasite load is reduced, there is less for the cleaner to eat
without biting client tissue – i.e. engaging in exploitation
– and for the same reason less for the client to gain from
the cleaner’s attentions. If, however, the potential ben-
efits to the cleaner decrease because of satiation, then the
benefit function is likely to differ for cleaners and clients
(as the latter benefit from parasite removal regardless of
how hungry the client is). In addition, if temporary
satiation of the cleaner is important, we might also
suppose that the potential benefits of exploitation (or,
equivalently, the cost inflicted on the client for a given
level of exploitative benefit obtained by the cleaner)
change over time.
As regards the second assumption we emphasized
above, it is certainly possible that the benefits to be
gained from an encounter will depend upon the time
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since an individual last engaged in an interaction (as well
as its duration). If a client, for example, has its parasite
load reduced by a cleaner, then it may have little to gain
from a new interaction until this load has built up once
again. If cleaners can become satiated, an equivalent
argument applies to them also. By contrast, we have
assumed that each new interaction offers the same,
initially high rate of gain. This assumption is acceptable if
there is sufficient delay between interactions for individ-
uals to return to their baseline state, but may be
problematic when encounters are very frequent. Unfor-
tunately, however, to model optimal behaviour, when
the benefits of cooperation depend on past history, would
require a state-dependent approach (see Houston &
McNamara, 1999) that is likely to prove less tractable
than our current analysis.
Conclusions
In general, our model shows that the threat of terminat-
ing interaction, while it can serve to suppress cheating
under some circumstances, is highly sensitive to market
forces. As this is a simple, and probably widespread form
of control, especially in asymmetric interactions (Schu-
essler, 1989; Hauk, 2001; West et al., 2002; Frank, 2003;
Sachs et al., 2004; Cant & Johnstone 2006; Foster &
Wenseleers, 2006), our results argue for the general
importance of markets in the maintenance of coopera-
tion, supporting the various empirical studies in which
market forces have been found to influence pay-off
distributions (Noe¨, 1990; Schwartz & Hoeksema 1998;
Wilkinson, 2001; Bshary & Grutter, 2002; Henzi &
Barrett, 2002; Simms & Taylor 2002).
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